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No. 12-5043
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 
FOR THE SIXTH CIRCUIT
REBEKAH CARDENAS-MEADE, )
) ON APPEAL FROM THE UNITED
Plaintiff-Appellant, ) STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR
) THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF
v. )
)
)
)
)
TENNESSEE
PFIZER, INC.,
Defendant-Appellee.
BEFORE: CLAY and STRANCH, Circuit Judges; BELL, District Judge*
PER CURIAM. Plaintiff-Appellant Rebekah Cardenas-Meade appeals an order granting 
summary judgment to Defendant-Appellee Pfizer, Inc. For the following reasons, we AFFIRM.
BACKGROUND
Cardenas-Meade began working at Pfizer as a pharmaceutical sales representative in J anuary 
2006. Pfizer has a training program for all representatives. After 18-20 months, this program 
culminates in a three-day evaluative session known as Phase VI. In October 2007, Cardenas-Meade 
failed the written exam at Phase VI, at which point she confided in program supervisors that she was 
having marital and family care issues. She alleges that, after this disclosure, she was treated in a 
discriminatory and abusive manner the rest of Phase VI, most notably by her supervisors, James 
MacDougall and Bo Shealy.
* The Honorable Robert Holmes Bell, United States D istrict Judge for the W estern 
D istrict o f M ichigan, sitting by designation.
AUTHENTICATED 
U.S. GOVERNMENT 
INFORMATION ^
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Per company policy, Cardenas-Meade understood she would be placed on probation when 
she returned to work and would have six months to pass Phase VI or be terminated. 
Cardenas-Meade never returned to work. Instead, she immediately went on medical leave because 
of the emotional trauma she suffered at Phase VI. Pfizer referred Cardenas-Meade to Dr. Carrie 
Booher, a psychologist, for treatment. She diagnosed Cardenas-Meade with severe anxiety and 
depression. During Cardenas-Meade’s leave, Dr. Booher regularly submitted treatment plans to 
Pfizer advising it that Cardenas-Meade was taking medication and undergoing counseling, but that 
returning to work for her current supervisors, Shealy and MacDougall, was not yet an option because 
they played a significant role in contributing to her stress. During this time, Human Resources 
Representative Kerry Sorvino investigated Cardenas-Meade’s complaint of gender and disability 
discrimination at Phase VI. Sorvino concluded that Cardenas-Meade failed Phase VI for legitimate, 
non-discriminatory reasons. In April 2008, Cardenas-Meade and Dr. Booher requested three 
accommodations in order for her to be able to return to work. All of these involved Cardenas-Meade 
returning to work for different supervisors. In accordance with company policy, Pfizer declined to 
transfer Cardenas-Meade or to assign her to a different supervisor because she had not yet passed 
Phase VI. Because her doctor had not yet released her to return to work with her current supervisors, 
Shealy and MacDougall, Pfizer extended her leave without pay in April 2008.
Despite knowing of Pfizer’s policy prohibiting representatives from working a second job 
with a competitor, Cardenas-Meade began working for inVentive as a pharmaceutical representative 
on May 12, 2008. Cardenas-Meade claims she considered herself discharged when her leave, 
benefits, and income ended on April 13, 2008, and she had not been allowed to return to work.
Cardenas-Meade filed charges of gender and disability discrimination with the Equal 
Employment Opportunity Commission (“EEOC”) on May 14, 2008. On June 17, 2008, Pfizer
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terminated her when it discovered she was working for inVentive. Cardenas-Meade filed a charge 
of retaliation with the EEOC following her termination. Pfizer contends it was unaware of her first 
charge with the EEOC when it made the decision to terminate her.
On June 17, 2009, Cardenas-Meade filed a complaint in district court alleging violation of 
the Family and Medical Leave Act, disability discrimination, gender discrimination, and retaliation. 
Pfizer moved for summary judgment on February 11,2011. This motion was granted on December 
5, 2011, and judgment was entered in favor of Pfizer. Cardenas-Meade timely appealed the entry 
of judgment on her disability discrimination and retaliation claims.
STANDARD OF REVIEW
This court reviews a district court’s grant of summary judgment de novo. Bowling Green v. 
Martin Land Dev. Co., 561 F.3d 556, 558 (6th Cir. 2009). “The court shall grant summaryjudgment 
if  the movant shows that there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled 
to judgment as a matter of law.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a). In deciding a motion for summary judgment, 
this court examines all evidence in the light most favorable to the non-moving party. Tingle v. 
Arbors at Hillard, 692 F.3d 523, 529 (6th Cir. 2012).
DISCUSSION
I. Disability Discrimination
To prevail on her disability claim under either the Americans with Disabilities Act (“ADA”), 
42 U.S.C. §§ 12101-12117,1 or the Tennessee Disability Act (“TDA”), Tenn. Code. § 8-50-103,2
'The ADA Amendm ents A ct o f 2008, Pub. L. No. 110-325, 122 Stat. 3553, amended 
several sections o f the ADA. These amendm ents went into effect after P lain tiff’s termination 
and were not m ade retroactive. Accordingly, they do not govern our analysis.
2“A claim brought under the THA [T ennessee Handicap Act, now known as the TDA] 
is analyzed under the same principles as those utilized for the Am ericans w ith Disabilities
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Cardenas-Meade was required to show (a) she was disabled, (b) she was otherwise qualified to 
perform the essential functions of the job with or without reasonable accommodation,3 and (c) she 
suffered an adverse employment action because of a disability. Monette v. Elec. Data Sys. Corp., 
90 F.3d 1173, 1178 (6th Cir. 1996), abrogated on other grounds by Lewis v. Humboldt Acquisition 
Corp., 681 F.3d 312 (6th Cir. 2011); Barnes v. Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co., 48 S.W.3d 698, 705 
(Tenn. 2000), abrogated on other grounds by Gossett v. Tractor Supply Co., 320 S.W.3d 777 (Tenn. 
2010). “Entry of summary judgment is appropriate ‘against a party who fails to make a showing 
sufficient to establish the existence of an element essential to that party’s case, and on which that 
party will bear the burden of proof at trial.’” In re Morris, 260 F.3d 654, 665 (6th Cir. 2001) 
(quoting Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322 (1986)).
To establish a disability under the pre-amendment ADA or the TDA an individual must (1) 
have a physical or mental impairment which “substantially limits” her in at least one major life 
activity, (2) have a record of such impairment, or (3) be regarded by the employer as having such an 
impairment. 42 U.S.C. § 12102(2) (1990); Tenn. Code § 4-21-102(3)(A). “Major life activities” 
are defined as “functions such as caring for oneself, performing manual tasks, walking, seeing, 
hearing, speaking, breathing, learning, and working.” 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(i). “When the major life 
activity under consideration is that of working, the statutory phrase ‘substantially limits’ requires,
A ct.” Sasser v. Quebecor Printing (USA) Corp., 159 S.W .3d 579, 584 (Tenn. Ct. App. 
2004). See also Barnes v. Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co., 48 S.W .3d 698, 705 (Tenn. 2000) 
(“W e, therefore, may look to federal law for guidance in enforcing our own 
anti-discrim ination law s.”) Unless expressly noted, the following law and analysis applies 
to both the TDA and the ADA.
3The TDA does not require that a reasonable accom m odation be made. See Tenn. 
Code. § 8-50-103.
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at a minimum, that plaintiff[] allege [she is] unable to work in a broad class of jobs.” Sutton v. 
United Air Lines, Inc., 527 U.S. 471, 491 (1999).
The district court determined that Cardenas-Meade was not disabled because her illness did 
not substantially limit the major life activity of working. The court stated that the “major life activity 
of working is not ‘substantially limited’ if  plaintiff merely cannot work under a certain supervisor 
because of anxiety and stress related to his review of her job performance.” Cardenas-Meade, 
however, argues that the district court ignored the evidence that her depression and anxiety 
substantially affected major life activities other than “work.” This evidence included: Dr. Booher’s 
December 2007 diagnosis, which included a below-average “global assessment functioning” score; 
her own deposition testimony and interrogatory responses noting that her illness substantially 
affected her “eating, sleeping, concentrating, doing daily activities . . . [and] daily functioning”; and 
extensive correspondence between Pfizer representatives and Dr. Booher.
The district court appears to have misinterpreted Cardenas-Meade’s claim. The court relied 
largely on Dr. Booher’s statement that the primary triggering event for Cardenas-Meade’s illness 
“occurred in the workplace.” As an initial matter, however, the fact that a triggering event occurs 
in the workplace should not dictate how a court considers the impact of an ailment on non-work 
major life activities. If Cardenas-Meade sustained a physical injury on the job, a court could 
properly find that the injury limited non-work activities such as lifting or driving, necessitating 
reasonable accommodation in the workplace. Neither Pfizer nor the district court adequately 
explained why Cardenas-Meade’s mental illness should be treated differently.
Considering the limitations on Cardenas-Meade’s non-work activities, however, the court 
still must conclude that she has not met her burden of showing disability within the meaning of the 
pre-amendment ADA. “When determining whether an individual is substantially limited in
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performing a major life activity, courts should consider three factors: (1) the nature and severity of 
the impairment; (2) the duration or expected duration of the impairment, and (3) the permanent or 
long-term impact of the impairment.” Novak v. MetroHealth Med. Ctr., 503 F.3d 572, 581 (6th Cir. 
2007) (citing 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(j)(2)). Thus, “[o]ne of the factors that is relevant to determining 
whether an impairment amounts to a disability is whether it is ‘permanent or long-term.’” Bryson 
v. Regis Corp., 498 F.3d 561, 575 (6th Cir. 2007) (quoting Toyota Motor Mfg., Ky., Inc. v. Williams, 
534 U.S. 184, 196 (2002)). As the district court observed, “[g]enerally, short-term temporary 
restrictions are not substantially limiting.” Roush v. Weastec, Inc., 96 F.3d 840, 843 (6th Cir. 1996).
Despite the voluminous record in this case, Cardenas-Meade has been unable to direct this 
court to evidence that the limits on her non-work activities were anything more than a short-term, 
temporary result of the anxiety and depression triggered by actions leading up to and during her 
failed Phase VI examination. While Cardenas-Meade has stated that prior to the October 2007, 
Phase VI examination she had been having problems with her marriage and with child care, she has 
not asserted that her alleged disability predated the Phase VI examination.
Moreover, while Dr. Booher stated that Cardenas-Meade was not ready to return to work for 
Shealy and MacDougall until June 2008, Cardenas-Meade testified that her symptoms began 
alleviating in February 2008 and she was feeling “a lot better” by March 2008. She testified that by 
that time, “I was able to concentrate. I was sleeping better, I was eating better. I was doing the 
things that were necessary in order for me to be able to perform a job better.” Cardenas-Meade has 
not pointed to any evidence in the record that Dr. Booher or another treating physician considered 
her anxiety and depression to be a permanent condition or one with a “long-term impact.” See 
Novak, 503 F.3d at 581. The long-term impact o f a condition is not necessarily dispositive of 
whether it may qualify as a disability under the ADA. In this case, however, the lack of evidence
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supporting long-term impact -  considered along with the other relevant factors and the entire record 
-  do not provide sufficient evidence such that a reasonable jury could find Cardenas-Meade 
“disabled” under the terms of the pre-amendment ADA.
Alternatively, Cardenas-Meade could establish an ADA disability (or a TDA disability) by 
showing that Pfizer regarded her as disabled. See 42 U.S.C. § 12102(2) (1990). A person may be 
regarded as disabled in two ways under the pre-amendment ADA: “(1) a covered entity mistakenly 
believes that a person has a physical impairment that substantially limits one or more major life 
activities, or (2) a covered entity mistakenly believes that an actual, nonlimiting impairment 
substantially limits one or more major life activities.” Sutton, 527 U.S. at 489. The evidence 
submitted by Cardenas-Meade establishes that Pfizer did not view her as substantially limited or treat 
her differently on account of a perceived disability.
Cardenas-Meade relies primarily on an April 30, 2008, letter from Pfizer to Cardenas-Meade 
to demonstrate Pfizer’s regard of her condition. This letter stated that “[biased on your healthcare 
provider’s statements, you are not yet medically able to return to work.” The emphasized clause 
refers to statements made by Dr. Booher, in an April 16 Return to Work form and an April 21 letter, 
that Cardenas-Meade could perform all the functions of her pharmaceutical representative job, but 
could not do so if  under the supervision of Shealy and MacDougall. Thus, this is not evidence that 
Pfizer viewed Cardenas-Meade as substantially limited. Moreover, Pfizer’s neutral rule against pre­
Phase VI transfers weakens Cardenas-Meade’s claim that Pfizer treated her differently on account 
of a perceived disability. While Cardenas-Meade testified that other Pfizer employees are allowed 
to transfer or take advantage of Pfizer’s transitional program, she did not rebut Pfizer’s testimony 
that these transfer policies do not apply to employees who have yet to successfully complete Phase 
VI training.
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Because Cardenas-Meade was not disabled within the meaning of the pre-amendment ADA 
or the TDA as a matter of law, it is unnecessary to consider the other elements necessary to make 
out a claim of disability discrimination. However, even if  th court considered Cardenas-Meade’s 
argument that Pfizer failed to reasonably accommodate her, it would be difficult for Cardenas-Meade 
to show that her requested accommodations were reasonable.
Employers “who fail to engage in the interactive process in good faith[] face liability... if  a 
reasonable accommodation would have been possible.” Barnett v. U.S. Air, Inc., 228 F.3d 1105, 
1116 (9th Cir. 2000) (en banc), vacated on other grounds by 535 U.S. 391 (2002). But while a 
reasonable accommodation under the ADA does include “reassignment to a vacant position,” 42 
U.S.C. § 12111(9)(B), requests for re-assignment to a new supervisor are disfavored. See, e.g., 
Weiler v. Household Fin. Corp., 101 F.3d 519, 526 (7th Cir. 1996). While it is appropriate to 
consider the reasonableness of such a request on a “case-by-case” basis, there is a “presumption . .
. that a request to change supervisors is unreasonable, and the burden of overcoming that 
presumption (i.e., of demonstrating that, within the particular context of plaintiff’s workplace, the 
request was reasonable) therefore lies with the plaintiff.” Kennedy v. Dresser Rand Co., 193 F.3d 
120, 122-23 (2d Cir. 1999). Here, given that Cardenas-Meade was in a probationary initial training 
period as an employee and had already failed the required final examination, it is not clear that the 
benefits of such a transfer would have outweighed the associated administrative costs. See Gaul v. 
Lucent Techs. Inc., 134 F.3d 576, 581 (3d Cir. 1998) (noting the administrative burdens of a transfer 
where it was requested in order to avoid exposure to current co-workers).
Nonetheless, this court does not need to reach this issue. Because Cardenas-Meade was not 
disabled within the meaning of the pre-amendment ADA or the TDA as a matter of law, the entry
Case: 12-5043 Document: 006111547991 Filed: 01/03/2013 Page: 9
of summary judgment on the disability discrimination claims in favor of Pfizer was appropriate. See 
Morris, 260 F.3d at 665.
II. Retaliation
To establish a prima facie case for retaliation a plaintiff must show:
(1) that plaintiff engaged in an activity protected by [the relevant statutes]; (2) that 
the exercise of his [or her] civil rights was known by the defendant; (3) that, 
thereafter, the defendant took an employment action adverse to the plaintiff; and (4) 
that there was a causal connection between the protected activity and the adverse 
employment action.
Hollins v. Atlantic Co., 188 F.3d 652, 661 (6th Cir. 1999) (quoting Christopher v. Stouder Mem ’l 
Hosp., 936 F.2d 870, 877 (6th Cir. 1991)). If a prima facie case is established, the burden shifts to 
the employer to proffer a legitimate, non-retaliatory reason for the adverse employment action. 
Niswander v. Cincinnati Ins. Co., 529 F.3d 714, 720 (6th Cir. 2008). If the employer does so, the 
burden shifts back to the plaintiff to show that such a reason was pretext for discrimination. Id.
Cardenas-Meade engaged in the following protected activities: (1) taking FMLA leave; (2) 
making an internal complaint of gender discrimination; and (3) making a complaint regarding 
disability and gender discrimination to the EEOC. However, Cardenas-Meade fails to show that 
Pfizer took any adverse action on account of these activities.
Cardenas-Meade alleged the following adverse employments actions: (1) Pfizer’s refusal to 
return her to work after she took short-term leave; (2) Pfizer’s termination of her; (3) Pfizer’s 
alleged inclusion o f falsified Phase VI scores on her annual performance evaluation; (4) Pfizer’s 
failure to communicate about the results of her discrimination complaints; (5) Pfizer’s alleged failure 
to discuss her requests for a reasonable accommodation; (6) Pfizer’s documentation of allegedly false 
medical judgment in the April 30, 2008, letter; and (7) Pfizer’s decision to stop paying her income
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and benefits on April 13, 2008. There is no evidence that any of these actions were taken on account 
of Cardenas-Meade’s protected behavior.
First, Dr. Agatha Nody, Pfizer’s Regional Medical Director, was responsible for evaluating 
whether Cardenas-Meade was medically cleared to return to work. At all times, Dr. Nody followed 
the recommendations of Dr. Booher, Cardenas-Meade’s treating psychologist, including the 
recommendation that Cardenas-Meade could not return to work for her supervisors until at least June 
2008. In following this recommendation, Dr. Nody was unaware that Cardenas-Meade had made 
complaints of discrimination. Additionally, Pfizer was under no obligation to return 
Cardenas-Meade to work for different supervisors.
Second, the evidence undisputedly shows that Pfizer terminated Cardenas-Meade after 
finding out that she started working for a competitor, in violation of company policy. This is a 
legitimate, non-discriminatory reason for termination. Cardenas-Meade has offered no evidence that 
this was a pretext for retaliation.
Third, it is undisputed that Pfizer gives negative performance evaluations to every employee 
who fails Phase VI. There was no evidence that any scores from Phase VI were falsified. Instead, 
there is uncontroverted testimony from the evaluators that Cardenas-Meade earned failing scores.
Fourth and fifth, a failure to communicate does not constitute an adverse employment action. 
Even if  it could, Pfizer offered evidence that human resources did not contact Cardenas-Meade with 
the results of the discrimination investigation or to discuss her requests for transfer to different 
supervisors because it was Pfizer policy not to do so with employees on medical leave. 
Cardenas-Meade herself testified that she knew she could not be transferred until after she
successfully completed Phase VI.
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Sixth, the statement made by Dr. Nody that Cardenas-Meade was unable to return to work 
was not false. As discussed, Dr. Nody’s statement was in reference to Dr. Booher’s opinion that 
Cardenas-Meade could not return to work for her current supervisors. Cardenas-Meade has not 
claimed that she was able to return to work for her current supervisors in April 2008.
Seventh, Cardenas-Meade’s short-term disability benefits expired naturally in April 2008, 
not because of a subjective decision by Pfizer. She applied for long-term disability in May 2008 and 
was denied such benefits on May 15, 2008. However, she was hired at inVentive on May 12, 2008, 
three days before the letter denying her long-term disability benefits application. Consequently, 
Cardenas-Meade’s unpaid leave was consistent with Pfizer policy, and she remained employed up 
until the time she accepted employment with a competitor and Pfizer terminated her in response.
In sum, Cardenas-Meade has offered no evidence that Pfizer took adverse employment 
actions against her on account of her protected activities. Even if  she had, there is no evidence that 
any of Pfizer’s legitimate, non-discriminatory reasons for its actions were pretexts for retaliation. 
Accordingly, Pfizer was entitled to summary judgment on Cardenas-Meade’s retaliation claims.
CONCLUSION
For these reasons, we AFFIRM the judgment of the district court.
